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OF ILLEGAL APPARATS BY FREE WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES



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Distributed January 1960


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ESTABLISHMENT OR STRENGTHENING OF ILLEGAL APPARATS BY FREE WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES

January 1960



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I. ANALYSIS

Preparations for the establishment of a clandestine Communist party organization or illegal apparat parallel to the party's legal overt organization have recently been reported in several Free World Communist parties.* There are also indications that legally operating Communist parties in countries where previous conditions of suppression prompted the establishment of illegal apparats are taking steps to strengthen their apparats. There is some evidence to show that the emphasis on illegal organization may go hand in hand with an increased effort by each Communist party to penetrate its country's police and military forces. Finally,



Clandestine activity in some form is always a part of the Communist party operations in a Free World country regardless of whether the party is legal or illegal. For example, a Communist party may set up a special clandestine mechanism or apparat to facilitate the channeling of funds. Such an apparat may or may not be illegal in the sense of being against the laws of the country, but is frequently referred to by the Communists themselves as an "illegal apparat". As used in this paper, the term "illegal apparat" refers to a clandestine party organization compartmented from the party's conventional organization, whose members are not generally known as Communists, whose primary purpose is the continuance of party operations under conditions of severe repression, and which may include organizational provision for violent action up to the level of paramilitary forces.

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there are indications that Communist parties in several countries have either established a capability for armed action, such as a paramilitary force, or demonstrated an interest in such a capability. Whether this capability is part and parcel of the existing (or planned, as the case may be) illegal organization or a special compartmented mechanism of the Party, is as yet undetermined.


It should be noted further that at least one illegal party, the KPD in West Germany, recently has been reported -- although not confirmed -- as establishing a separate clandestine apparatus for sabotage and armed action divorced from the political mechanism of the Party. Also, a usually reliable source has recently reported that in the illegal CP of Panama all new memberships are on a clandestine basis. This suggests either that the CP Panama is establishing a separate illegal organization comprising unknown Communists distinct from the known CP which is technically illegal; or that the existing illegal organization is being improved and more stringent security practices are being instituted. CP Australia, it may be noted, is known for using secret Party members for its illegal operations.

Communist parties reported to be in varying stages of establishing a clandestine party organization or improving an existing organization include those of Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, and the USA in the Western Hemisphere; France, Italy and West Germany in Europe; India, Israel, Lebanon, and Pakistan in the Near and Middle East; and Indonesia and Japan in the Far East. For most of these parties the pressure of local events made the question of establishing an illegal apparat an immediate problem. The reported attention to illegal apparats by the

above parties may be indicative of similar attention by other parties of the International Communist Movement (hereafter referred to as ICM).

Although a CP normally works with both overt and clandestine methods, it tends to stress one or the other based on local political conditions and the prevailing tactical line of the ICM. Since the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, the tactical line for the ICM has emphasized for the CP's in the Free World the employment of legal methods, coupled with the penetration, exploitation, and manipulation of nationalist and amenable leftist and trade union forces in a massive offensive.


There are indications that some CP's, particularly in Free World countries where political conditions are favorable to legal parliamentary tactics, emphasized legal means almost to the exclusion of clandestine operations. Other CP's, with limited resources, concentrated on the parliamentary struggle rather than disperse their limited resources. It is believed that this situation appeared deplorable to the CPSU, which foresaw its offensive tactics leading either to counterpressures forcing the CP's to go underground or to a situation favorable to a takeover by the CP. From its viewpoint, under these conditions, an illegal apparat or clandestine organization paralleling and compartmented from the overt party would be considered essential; in the former case to protect the party and in the latter case to play a key role if required. The situation is also believed to have appeared unsatisfactory to the CPSU with respect to certain illegal parties which, long suppressed, had placed too great an emphasis upon purely clandestine agent operations -- resulting in a consequent weakening of the illegal membership base



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of the Party. An example of this is the 1957 criticism of Zachariades by the KKE Central Committee in the Soviet bloc, in which he was described as following a "line of detachment from the masses". Accordingly, the CPSU appears to have decided to take necessary corrective measures.

The renewed emphasis on the establishment of illegal or parallel apparats by Communist parties in the Free World appears to have stemmed from the gathering of delegations from some sixty-five Communist parties at Moscow in November 1957 for the 40th anniversary celebration of the October Revolution. Stressing the importance of this gathering for the ICM, the Soviet press at that time commented that "there has been no event like it in the Communist movement for more than twenty years," an obvious comparison to the important Seventh (and last) World Congress of the Comintern held in 1935. The conclusions of the Moscow gathering were embodied in the Twelve-Party Declaration which set the policy for the ICM. Significantly, this declaration restricted the "parliamentary road to Socialism" to "a number of capitalist countries" and stated that in case of resistance by reactionary forces, "the possibility of nonpeaceful transition to Socialism should be borne in mind." Pursuant to this latter proviso, the CPSU leaders secretly pointed out to representatives of the Free World Communist parties the advisability of establishing illegal or parallel apparats and increasing efforts to penetrate the security services. Some party leaders, notably the secretarygeneral of the Indian Communist Party, raised objections to establishing an illegal apparat, and no firm agreement or policy binding on all parties appears to have been reached at that time. However, even the Indian Communist Party concurred in the advisability of increasing efforts to penetrate the security services.




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Following the November 1957 Moscow Conference, Soviet representatives are believed to have reiterated to a number of Communist parties the CPSU desire for the establishment of illegal apparats. Particular attention appears to have been given by these functionaries to the parties reluctant to undertake this action. That the CPSU achieved some success in its over-all efforts is indicated by the fact that during 1958 the Communist parties of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela in Latin America; France and Italy in Europe; India, Israel, Lebanon and Pakistan in the Near and Middle East; and Indonesia and Japan in the Far East were reported in varying stages of establishing or strengthening illegal apparats and/or preparing for paramilitary activities. Of these parties, the case of the Indian Communist Party (CPI) is perhaps most interesting because the CPSU had to overcome a strong reluctance on the part of the leadership of the CPI to the establishment of an illegal apparat.

Subsequently, the CPSU used the occasion of its 21st Party Congress (held at Moscow from 27 January to 5 February 1959 and attended by some seventy-two CP delegations) to emphasize again to selected Free World Communist parties the necessity of establishing illegal apparats and developing a capability for armed action in case of need. Guidance on these points was given to representatives of certain Free World CP's attending the Congress by CPSU officials, including Khrushchev himself. Similar guidance was given by officials of the Communist Party of China (CPC), including MAO Tse-tung, to CP representatives from Latin America who visited Peiping after the 21st Congress of the CPSU.

In guidance to the Italian Communist Party (PCI), Khrushchev is reported to have stated that a crucial period



for the peace of the world was at hand and that the party's clandestine organization should be reviewed and strengthened in view of this grave prospect. He emphasized that even if the Berlin situation did not reach the point of armed conflict, the need for a strong illegal apparat was vital because of the possibility of suppressive action against the CP's in Western Europe.

With respect to the Indian Communist Party, the Japan Communist Party, and probably other Communist parties in the Middle East and Far East, leading CPSU and CPC officials pointed out that recent military coups as in Burma, Pakistan, and Sudan and the development of repressive anti-Communist policies by governments in these areas seriously threaten the survival of the CP's. The Indian Communist Party and possibly others were admonished to meet this threat by developing apparats capable of armed resistance, or at least by building the cadre of an underground party. They were also instructed to intensify their efforts to penetrate their countries' military and police circles.

With respect to Latin America, CPC officials gave a detailed briefing on the necessity of establishing illegal apparats to the representatives of fifteen Latin American Communist parties* who visited Red China in February and March 1959 after the 21st CPSU Congress. This briefing was given in a context of encouraging the Latin American CP's to



^{*}Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.

pursue the "national liberation struggle" which the Cuban revolution had shown could be successful in the imperialist rear. Although the CPC approved of the armed revolution which occurred in Cuba, it was recommended that elsewhere peaceful and legal tactics should be tried first. The time for armed struggle would be determined by the conditions of imperialist oppression rather than by the Communists' own decision. The Communist parties must be prepared for this eventuality, and therefore an illegal apparat functioning parallel to a legal or semi-legal Communist party in each country must be established. The important aspect, according to CPC officials who briefed James Jackson of the CPUSA (secretary for negro and southern affairs), was not that a Communist party have a large membership, but that it have an underground organization in reserve and protected.

The CPC officials emphasized that the knowledge of the existence of the illegal Communist party must be limited to members of the Central Committee of the legal CP, and better still, to only a few of them. The illegal CP should never surface, even if conditions of legality permit. When part of the illegal CP or one of its members loses contact, by reason of investigation or repression, the "lost" unit or individual should join the overt, legal CP without even mentioning the illegal CP. The illegal CP should be organized in highly compartmented form to avoid destruction when part of it is discovered.

The CPC officials pointed out that the CPC used this system to advantage, especially in Shanghai, where without it the CPC could not have been so successful. They stated, moreover, that a truly clandestine Communist party operating alongside a legal CP is essential to avoid disaster brought

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about by total repression. In addition, the parallel illegal CP, apart from its normal tasks, is in a good position to obtain financial assistance from various sources for both the overt and covert CP organizations, and to facilitate the collection of information.

It appears that both the CPSU and the CPC agreed that the various CP's should operate legally, if possible, while holding an illegal apparat in reserve for the defense of the party or for offensive action at the proper time. However, within the framework of increased fraternal liaison and assistance as sanctioned by the CPSU, the CPC, in its guidance and training of other CP's, has stressed clandestine work, citing in particular practical illustrations from the CPC's own successful rise to power. CPSU training of CP functionaries, on the other hand, has been, so far as is known, of a more academic nature. There is also some evidence that the CPC in its guidance and training of other CP's is seeking to increase its influence and stature within the ICM by presenting its experiences as more up-to-date and pertinent for parties currently engaged in "national liberation struggles" than the experiences of any other Communist party. It appears that Latin American Communists in particular are becoming more inclined to regard the CPC as their guide to the revolution on the grounds that problems faced by the CPC are similar to those confronting Communists in Latin America, and that therefore the CPC experience has considerable applicability. Because clandestine work played such a large part in the CPC rise to power, more emphasis on illegal apparats may thus be expected in those CP's susceptible to CPC influence. In the reported cases of Communist parties establishing a clandestine party organization or improving an existing organization, the extent of progress varies from party to

party. In some cases only initial preparations have been made to meet the possibility of the party being outlawed. Such preparations include arrangement for safekeeping of documents and valuable movable property, the establishment of secure communications channels, the designation of substitutes for well-known key personnel, and the training of selected personnel for the clandestine party. In other cases organizational preparations have progressed to the point where an underground cadre is in being with leaders selected and secret party members instructed and recruited. In some instances organizational measures have gone so far as to include the establishment of clandestine paramilitary groups or "shock troops", the acquisition and caching of arms, paramilitary training, and preparations for sabotage (including training in preparation of explosives and other sabotage techniques). However, as noted previously, the exact relationship between the paramilitary structure of a party and that party's illegal apparat is not clear.

In certain cases selected secret CP members were designated to form an ostensibly non-Communist party to operate legally in the event the Communist party is outlawed. Use of a front party operating legally is, of course, an accepted Communist technique in countries where the CP is both illegal and suppressed.

Personnel involved in the establishment of illegal apparats or paramilitary forces appear as a general rule to fall into one or more of the following categories:

a. Individuals known in the past to be representative of the group within the CP most inclined towards violent tactics. Examples of this are Putchalapalli Sundarayya and Harkishan Singh Surjit in the CP India,

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and Rafael ECHEVERRIA Flores and Jorge RIVADENEIRA A. in the CP Ecuador.

- b. Persons with past experience in illegal or paramilitary activities. Here again are Sundarayya and Surjit; Charles Tillon of the CP France, an exresistance fighter; and Suhayl Yamut and Ibrahim Munaymnah of the CP Lebanon, both known to have previously engaged in terrorist activities.
- c. Persons holding party positions which have historically been involved in the establishment of illegal apparats, (i.e. Organization Secretary, Control Commission Chairman, Cadre Department head). As examples, Phil Bart, organization secretary of the CPUSA, was made responsible for the establishment of a skeleton illegal apparat; Jorge RIVADENEIRA A., the secretary for organization of the Pichincha Provincial Committee of the CP Ecuador, is allegedly responsible for the organization of a paramilitary force; Jesus Encarnacion VALDEZ Ochoa, secretary for organization of the CP Mexico, and Arnaldo MARTINEZ Verdugo, his deputy, are believed to have received a briefing on illegal apparats from CPC officials.

It is possible that training in the Bloc may also be a characteristic which could serve to identify persons concerned with illegal apparats. Rafael ECHEVERRIA Flores and Ricardo PAREDES of the CP Ecuador have both recently completed training in Communist China. The latter was involved in a previous attempt to establish an illegal apparat and the former is involved in the present effort to establish a paramilitary force. While this training is believed to have been primarily ideological, there is evidence that "experiences in

clandestine work" and "experiences in the armed struggle" were discussed.

Some of the persons involved do not at this time appear to fit into the above categories. However, it is possible that, as additional biographic information on these "mavericks" is accumulated, either they will tend to conform to the pattern suggested above or a new pattern will emerge. As examples of these "nonconformists", Felipe BESRODNIK, who appears to have been concerned previously with finances within the Buenos Aires Committee and the Central Committee of the Argentine CP, received a briefing on illegal apparats in Communist China and was subsequently reported as heading "shock troops" of the CP in Buenos Aires; Douglas BRAVO, who is responsible for the guerrilla force of the CP Venezuela, holds an undetermined position within the Federal District Committee in Caracas; and Teodoro NUNEZ Rebaza, alleged head of a paramilitary force planned by the CP Peru, is a Communist student at the University of San Marcos with no known official position within the Party.

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II. DISCUSSION OF CASES

In the past two years, the following legal parties previously reported as possessing illegal apparats are believed to have taken steps to improve their clandestine organizations -- either as a direct result of the pressure of local events or in response to guidance received from the CPSU and/or the CPC.

France

Despite its long-established illegal apparat, probably neglected in recent years, the French Communist Party (PCF) was in no position to operate illegally when de Gaulle came to power. Subsequent to the de Gaulle takeover in May 1958, the PCF, fearing that it would be outlawed, reportedly undertook preparations for such an eventuality. These preparations involved protection of documents and valuable movable property, decentralization of Party leadership, localization of the printing of propaganda, penetration of opposition political groups as well as the police and army, etc. However, these efforts were not long-lived and present indications are that the PCF has ceased all such preparations, at least on a broad and observable scale.

Indonesia

Indications that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) possesses an illegal apparat have been received from the immediate post-World War II period up to the present. Not least among these indications has been the revelation from time to time of the existence of

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secret PKI members in the ranks of other parties or in high government circles.

D. N. Aidit, secretary-general of the PKI, who attended the 21st Congress of the CPSU, is known to have returned via Communist China where he met with CPC officials (including MAO Tse-tung). Since the CPC is known to have briefed Latin American CP delegates who returned from the Congress via Peiping on illegal apparats, it is quite possible that Aidit received a similar briefing.

Information received subsequent to Aidit's return suggests that the PKI is expanding and strengthening its illegal apparat. Since about April 1959, new PKI cadres have been brought directly into the underground Party and not into the overt Party organization as was previously done; and in June 1959, a fairly reliable source revealed that the PKI intended to infiltrate the "Angkatan '45" (Generation of 1945) organization in order to develop it as a mechanism through which to carry on Party activities in the event the PKI should be outlawed or suppressed.

Italy

While there have been indications in the past that the PCI maintains an illegal apparat, it is not believed to have been very extensive or particularly active. It has been reported to have been involved in limited preparations for underground activity in the event the PCI should be outlawed, but its main activity seems to have been the penetration of Italian government institutions and political parties. However, as a result of discussions



with CPSU officials at the time of the 21st Congress, the PCI has reportedly increased its preparations for clandestine activity in the event the Party should be declared illegal.

The following legal parties, in the past two years, have taken steps towards the establishment of a clandestine organization parallel to the overt party organization. While some of these parties certainly acted under the pressure of local events, others are reliably reported to be acting in response to guidance from the CPSU and the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Argentina


In the latter part of January 1959 the Argentine Communist Party (PCA) showed its concern over the possibility of illegality when it issued directives cautioning PCA members against any actions which would provoke the Argentine Government into declaring the Party illegal and instructing cell leaders to begin training Party members in underground techniques. At that time, Felipe BESRODNIK, a member of the Central Committee of the PCA responsible for finances, was in Moscow attending the 21st Party Congress of the CPSU. It is known that he returned via Peiping where he was among Latin American CP representatives who received a briefing from officials urging the establishment of illegal apparats. Reports received in early 1959 reflected that the PCA was indeed making preparations for underground activity -- particularly after FRONDIZI's executive order given in April which forbade all Party activities, although it did not actually outlaw the PCA. Subsequent to the restrictive order the PCA

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instituted measures to increase the security of Party communications; began the dispersal of files, correspondence and compromising papers; ordered the establishment of safehouses for clandestine meetings; and made arrangements for the shifting of Party head-quarters to a covert location in Cordoba. That these preparations on the part of the PCA are not for naught is shown by recent reports that the FRONDIZI government intends to initiate court action which may result in the Party being declared illegal.

Ecuador

At some time prior to 1948 a member of the Spanish Communist Party who was passing through Ecuador briefed Ricardo PAREDES, then secretary-general of the Ecuadoran Communist Party (PCE), on the troika system utilized by the Spanish Communists and urged PAREDES to start immediately organizing such a system in Ecuador. PAREDES did indeed take initial steps towards the establishment of an illegal apparat, but shortly thereafter, in 1948, PAREDES' power in the Party was broken and the PCE dropped the idea completely. PAREDES' replacement as secretary-general of the PCE was Pedro SAAD, who favored a relatively legal approach. In January and February 1959 SAAD attended the 21st Congress of the CPSU, accompanied by Rafael ECHEVERRIA Flores, secretary-general of the Pichincha Provincial Committee of the PCE, who had just completed six months training in Communist China. It is believed that SAAD and ECHEVERRIA went to Peiping after the Congress and there received a briefing on illegal apparats from CPC officials. Subsequent to their return, SAAD is said to have altered his position



and in May 1959 the PCE was reported planning to establish a covert organization divorced from the overt Party.

India

Caveat: Details of the establishment of an illegal apparat in India and Ajoy Ghosh's discussions with CPSU and CPC officials emanate from a source of questionable reliability, but are included in this analysis because of the high degree of agreement between this data and similar information from other sources, pertaining to other CP's. The allegation that the Indian Communist Party is, indeed, in the process of establishing an illegal apparat has been confirmed by separate independent sources.

In early February 1958, the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi briefed two CPI officials, P. Sundarayya and Harkishan Singh Surjit, on the necessity of establishing an illegal apparat. Some difference of opinion developed within the CP India leadership over this question, and the Party secretarygeneral Ajoy Ghosh continued to voice opposition, as he had at the 40th Anniversary celebration in November 1957, on grounds that the Party reorganization required by such action would weaken the Party's efforts in the parliamentary struggle. At its Congress in Amritsar in April 1958, the CPI continued to emphasize the parliamentary struggle for attaining power and incorporated this concept in its Amritsar thesis. However, while the Congress was still in session, an important CPI official, P. Sundarayya, departed for Moscow to discuss the establishment of an illegal apparat. In mid-May 1958



Ajoy Ghosh also went to the Soviet Union to confer with officials of the CPSU. Upon their return to India in June and July, respectively, both officials were in agreement on the necessity of establishing an illegal apparat and of increasing efforts to penetrate India's armed forces. The coming to power of General de Gaulle in France, in spite of a highly organized CP with strong parliamentary support, was cited as an illustration of what might occur in India, and was used as a justification for the establishment by the CPI of an illegal apparat. P. Sundarayya was reportedly given the responsibility of beginning building this apparat immediately in Andhra Pradesh.

Ajoy Ghosh attended the 21st Congress of the CPSU and returned via Peiping. While in Moscow and Peiping he participated in discussions with CPSU and CPC officials in which he was allegedly informed that the military coups in the Middle East and Asia seriously threaten the survival of the Communist parties in those areas. To meet the threat, the CP's must develop apparats capable of armed resistance, or at least build the cadre of an underground party and must also intensify their efforts to penetrate military and police circles.

The CPI decision to establish an illegal apparat was strengthened by the Kerala crisis. As of September 1959, however, there was disagreement within Party leadership circles as to the form the apparat should take: one group apparently felt that the apparat should for the time being be organized with planning and preparatory tasks at the national and provincial levels alone; the other group favored a broader structure of a more militant character, to include the creation of units at the lowest levels of the Party.

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A noteworthy feature of the Indian case is the evidence that the CPI has been reluctant to weaken its overt organization and run the risk of compromising the parliamentary struggle by diverting assets to an illegal apparat, a problem which may also apply to other legal Communist parties heavily committed to overt activity in a parliamentary democratic context. Also of significance is the impact of de Gaulle's rise to power in France upon the CPI. This development had a similar impact on other parties of the ICM, and may have made the task of the CPSU easier in convincing the various CP's of the necessity of establishing an illegal apparat.

Israel

Violence which occurred in Nazareth on 1 May 1958 drew rumblings from Government circles that the Israeli Communist Party (Maki) might be outlawed. At the National Convention of Maki during the same month, two Maki politburo members referred to the necessity for preparing safeguards against the possibility that the Party might be declared illegal. Immediately after the convention initial steps were taken involving the covert recruitment of selected activists to take part in certain long-range plans for illegal work involving a complete break with Maki on the part of the selected individuals. However, it has recently been reported that these preparations have been discontinued.

Japan

Two reports received in late 1958 reflected concern by the JCP with the possibility that the Party might sometime be forced underground. The JCP delegation


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to the 21st Congress of the CPSU is believed to have discussed the suppression of CP's in various Free World countries and is known to have returned to Japan via Communist China, where discussions were held with CPC officials. After the return of the delegation to Japan, reports from a source of undetermined reliability reflected that the JCP was seeking to establish an organization known as the Kyuyu Kai, to be composed primarily of individuals not known to be Communists, which would enable the Party to continue its activities in the event it was declared illegal.

Mexico

A usually reliable source revealed that in June 1959 Juan Pablo SAINZ y Aguilar, acting secretary-general of the PCM during the absence of secretary-general Dionisio ENCINA Rodriguez (who led the PCM's delegation to the 21st Congress of the CPSU), intended to recommend that the PCM be reorganized as three separate entities comprising a legal structure, a semilegal apparatus composed of Party sympathizers, and an illegal apparatus consisting of persons who had never had any overt connection with the Communists. However, SAINZ decided to shelve the plan pending the return of ENCINA and the rest of the PCM delegation: Jesus Encarnacion VALDEZ Ochoa, secretary of organization, and Arnaldo MARTINEZ Verdugo, assistant secretary of organization. ENCINA is known to have returned to Mexico in late July or early August 1959. Since his return the proposal for the reorganization of the PCM has remained shelved, possibly because it was felt that the PCM should concentrate first on healing the split which was then plaguing the Party.



USA

James E. Jackson attended the 21st Congress of the CPSU as a representative of the CPUSA. Either in Russia or in Communist China he held a "lengthy discussion with Chinese comrades" who convinced him that the CPUSA should possess an organization in reserve and protected. Jackson passed his ideas on to the CPUSA leadership and, as a result, Phil Bart was designated organization secretary and charged with the establishment of the apparat. However, as of June 1959, Bart had reportedly taken no action.

Venezuela

The Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) regained legality on 23 March 1958. It is not known whether the PCV retained in reserve an illegal apparat parallel to the overt organization. A clandestine apparatus of the PCV is known to have been operating in the field of labor activities in September 1958, but it is not known if this was part of a parallel illegal apparat or a separate covert mechanism of the Party. It is also known that the PCV was represented among the Latin American CP members who were briefed on the advisability of establishing illegal apparats by CPC officials after the 21st Congress of the CPSU. Information dated September 1959 revealed that the PCV possesses a prepared list of Party members not known as Communists who could serve should the PCV be forced underground. The report alleged that, if declared illegal, the PCV would go underground and resurface behind the front of a new, unknown leadership.

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The following illegal CP's have either established or are believed to be in the process of establishing illegal apparats distinct from the Party's political mechanism.

Pakistan

The military coup in Pakistan on 7 October 1958 resulted in the abolishment of all political parties and the arrest of many Communists. Important and well-known CP leaders were instructed by the Party not to go into hiding or underground but to face arrest calmly and not attempt to escape imprisonment. Lesser-known leaders, however, who were important as agitators or activists, were told to go into immediate hiding so that they might be available for instructions through underground channels.

Panama

As mentioned earlier in this paper, all new memberships in the illegal CP of Panama, according to a recent report, are on a clandestine basis. This suggests either that the CP is establishing a separate illegal organization comprising unknown Communists distinct from the known CP which is technically illegal; or that the existing illegal structure is being improved and more stringent security practices are being initiated.

Another feature of the recent trend toward clandestine activities within the ICM is the establishment of a capability for armed action by certain Free World CP's. Communist parties in several countries, predominantly in Latin America, have demonstrated an interest in the establishment of, or have established, a paramilitary force. Whether such forces



are part and parcel of the existing (or planned, as the case may be) illegal apparat or a separate covert mechanism of the Party is as yet undetermined.

The following <u>legal</u> Communist parties have reportedly within the past two years established or considered the establishment of paramilitary forces.

Argentina

The PCA in Buenos Aires is said to have initiated in August 1958 a training course in military tactics, firing positions, hand-to-hand combat and sabotage. A usually reliable source, in an unconfirmed report, alleged that three "CPSU members" arrived in Argentina in September or October 1958 to conduct classes in "semi-military" tactics for Army veterans and PCA members. In early 1959 the PCA reportedly maintained in Buenos Aires a force of "shock troops" which took part in the violent anti-Government demonstrations of 3 April 1959. This force was said to be under the leadership of Felipe BESRODNIK (who visited Peiping after the 21st Congress of the CPSU). In May 1959 the PCA was allegedly training groups of young people in street-fighting and sabotage and had alerted the secretaries of the zone committees and made them responsible for organizing armed groups. During the spring and summer of 1959 evidence accumulated showing the PCA to be collecting arms and ammunition.

Ecuador

According to a usually reliable source, Rafael ECHEVERRIA Flores upon his return to Ecuador in March 1959 advocated the creation of a paramilitary

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
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force by the PCE. The revolutionary group of the PCE, as personified by ECHEVERRIA and Jorge RIVADENEIRA A., began developing a plan of action. The group was to conduct training courses in sabotage and paramilitary techniques. Each person trained was then to recruit and train five more who would in turn be responsible for five others. The system was to continue with each group of five knowing only the identity of its own leader. Pseudonyms were to be used by all members. A subsequent report from the same source revealed the existence in May 1959 of a group called the Comandos, headed by Jorge RIVADENEIRA A., numbering about seventy individuals. The membership of this group was apparently drawn from the young Communists' organization of the PCE. The Comandos were said to be organized into units of fifteen persons (these fifteen may have been further divided into squads of five, but there is no proof of that as yet). It subsequently became apparent that the PCE Comando group was only in the planning stages. However, in August 1959, with the approval of Pedro SAAD, secretary-general of the Party, RIVADENEIRA issued orders to expedite the development of the original plans. In September 1959, a separate, independent source, of unknown reliability, confirmed the fact that the PCE was attempting to organize some sort of parallel organization, based on groups of five persons, to be used for "tactical actions" rather than insurrection.

France

During the period immediately after the de Gaulle takeover in France, when the PCF was purportedly making preparations for illegality, it was alleged that the PCF was planning the creation of paramilitary cadres



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under the leadership of Charles Tillon, ex-resistance leader. This allegation was never confirmed and no further reports concerning such activity on the part of the PCF have been received.

India

There is unconfirmed evidence that the CP India may be planning the establishment of a paramilitary force. Information dated November 1958 from a non-Indian liaison service alleged that the CPI had opened a guerrilla training camp at Kakchin on the eastern border of Manipur adjacent to Burma.

Venezuela

During September 1958, the PCV discussed plans for the organization of a secret guerrilla force, having as its primary mission the repelling of attempted coups against the BETANCOURT Government (the PCV fears the return of a military regime); and as its secondary mission the support of the PCV in its struggle for power. Such a force was established with Douglas BRAVO, a member of the Federal District (Caracas) Regional Committee of the PCV, at its head. BRAVO was said to be responsible to a Comite Revolucionario de Comandos (Revolutionary Committee of Commandos), a subcommittee of the PCV Central Committee. Paramilitary training of members of the PCV guerrilla force was initiated in March 1959 at several secret locations and has continued on a regular basis up to the present time. There is some indication (but no proof) to suggest that the Italian Communist Party may be providing some support to the PCV relative to the organization and training of the guerrilla force.

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The following illegal or quasi-legal* Communist parties have reportedly established, or considered the establishment of, a covert paramilitary organization,

Brazil

In February 1958, the PCB is reported to have organized a special Guerrilla Warfare and Sabotage Commission to study the possible application of those methods by the PCB. There is no confirmation of this report nor has there been any indication that the PCB took any further action relative to the establishment of a clandestine paramilitary force.

Lebanon

In late December 1958 a usually reliable source reported the existence of a special two-man sub-committee attached to the Central Committee of the quasi-legal CP Lebanon. This subcommittee, known as the Technical Committee, was said to be responsible for paramilitary activities. Members of the committee were allegedly Suhayl Tamut and Ibrahim Munaymnah, both known to have been active as terrorists during the Lebanese violence of early 1958. There has been no confirmation of the existence of the Technical Committee.

^{*}By quasi-legal is meant CP's which operate more or less overtly, but which are not yet recognized as legal political entities. This is common to CP's in the transition from illegal to legal status; they are legal de facto, but not yet de jure.



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Peru

An unconfirmed report from a source of undetermined reliability, obtained in March 1958, informed that the PCP had selected one Teodoro NUNEZ Rebaza to organize a group of Communists and Communist sympathizers to be known as the Comando de Choque (Shock Command or Shock Commandos) to start riots and encourage violence during demonstrations. It was implied that the group was to be armed and that it would receive training in the use of firearms. No further reporting concerning such a group within the PCP has been received. It is known, however, that as of July 1958 Teodoro NUNEZ Rebaza, a Communist student at San Marcos University, was in contact with Jorge DEL PRADO Chavez, secretary of press and propaganda and member of the Central Committee of the PCP, and Raul ACOSTA, secretary-general of the Party. DEL PRADO and ACOSTA subsequently attended the 21st Congress of the CPSU, later visiting Communist China (where they were briefed on illegal apparats by CPC officials).

West Germany

A recent report from an official liaison source alleged that the KPD was initiating the establishment of a separate clandestine apparat for sabotage and armed action divorced from the political mechanism of the Party. This paramilitary organization was to be set up on the three-man or troika system and its functionaries were to receive special training in East Germany. There is, as yet, no confirmation of this report.

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